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Abstract 
1962 marked an important point in intellectual history not only for historians, 
philosophers, sociologists and scientists but also for educated laymen.  After 
a long and productive decade Thomas Kuhn published his Structure of Scien-
tific Revolutions as Volume 2 Issue 2 of the International Encyclopedia of Uni-
fied Science, edited (after the death of Otto Neurath) by Rudolf Carnap and 
Charles Morris.  2012 marked another important date—it was the 50th anni-
versary of Structure’s first edition.  The many conferences, workshops and 
presentations were documented in special issues and collections; one of them 
is Kuhn’s Structure of Scientific Revolutions – 50 Years On, edited by William 
J. Devlin and Alisa Bokulich.  The review aims to shed light on the collections 
relevance for current interdisciplinary studies. 
Keywords: Thomas Kuhn; Structure of Scientific Revolutions; philosophy of 
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1962 marked an important point in intellectual history not only for historians, 
philosophers, sociologists and scientists, but also for educated laymen.  After 
a long and in many ways productive decade, Thomas Kuhn published his 
Structure of Scientific Revolutions (SSR hereafter) as Volume 2 Issue 2 of the 
International Encyclopedia of Unified Science, edited (after the death of Otto 
Neurath) by Rudolf Carnap and Charles Morris.  2012 marked another im-
portant date—it was the 50th anniversary of SSR’s first edition.  The many 
 




conferences, workshops and presentations were documented in special issues 
and collections; one of them is Kuhn’s Structure of Scientific Revolutions – 50 
Years On, edited by William J.  Devlin and Alisa Bokulich. 
50 Years On is an important contribution to the constantly growing literature 
on Kuhn, along with the history and philosophy of science depicting certain 
new ways and recasting certain old ways in which we understand them.   
Due to the painstakingly detailed examination and reevaluation of logical em-
piricism that took place in the last two decades, it is quite widely known that 
some members of the movement, like Philipp Frank and Otto Neurath, pur-
sued interdisciplinary studies.  They aimed to utilize knowledge and ideas 
from physics, mathematics, sociology, economics and psychology emphasizing 
their deep-rooted interrelatedness.  Their reason to do so was the empirical 
underdetermination of scientific theories: given that empirical data do not 
determine unambiguously how to build up or choose between rival scientific 
theories, one shall investigate and keep an eye on various other branches of 
the sciences. 
Logical empiricists are, however, not known for their interdisciplinary or, as 
one might also say, science studies; it is Thomas Kuhn who, by defeating logi-
cal empiricists, became the merger of canons, pushing their unrelated con-
cerns in a common direction.  Though the underdetermination of theories was 
not unknown for Kuhn, he motivated his inquiries in his first book, violating 
the institutionalized boundaries (The Copernican Revolution, Harvard Univer-
sity Press, 1957), in the following way: since scientific concepts and theories 
are ideas, they could be investigated from the viewpoint of intellectual histo-
ry, hence the philosophy of science needs to broaden its viewpoint and per-
spective. 
Though many scholars have argued that the relation between Kuhn, Carnap 
and logical empiricism should be reevaluated in favor of the latter two (that is, 
by showing that Carnap’s and Kuhn’s projects were reconcilable and Kuhn did 
not kill logical empiricism from their point of view), Jonathan Y.  Tsou argues 
otherwise in his contribution to the volume.  His chapter is devoted to the 
reconsideration of the Carnap-Kuhn connection, and he tried to show that the 
newly emerged literature against the old thesis of Kuhn killing logical empiri-
cism is just far-fetched.  It is argued that “revisionist analyses fail to sufficient-
ly acknowledge that Carnap’s linguistic frameworks are logical reconstruc-
tions […], while Kuhn’s theory of scientific revolutions is motivated to pro-
vide  a   naturalistic description of scientific change” (p. 52).  Thus, says 







Tsou might be right about the differences of these scholars’ views, but the 
question is whether a Carnapian point of view could embrace the general nar-
rative of Kuhn.  According to the correspondence of Carnap (analyzed famous-
ly by George Reisch), he can do that, and according to the bipartite metatheory 
of logical empiricism (put forward by Thomas Uebel), the naturalistic descrip-
tion of actual scientific developments was just one wing of a broader concep-
tion of philosophy of science that was also accepted, besides Frank and Neu-
rath, by Carnap.  But more importantly, and it is a different question, Carnap 
is just one representative of logical empiricism, thus contrasting his views 
with Kuhn is never enough.  Kuhn allegedly contributed to the demise of logi-
cal empiricism and not that of Carnap per se. 
Besides logical empiricism (or logical positivism and the inevitable break be-
tween positivist and post-positivist science) the characterizing ideas and no-
tions of past Kuhn-scholarship were incommensurability and its relation to 
relativism, truth, and the rationality of science along with progress in science.  
50 Years On testifies that many (not all, of course) contemporary philosophers 
of science are not concerned anymore with these issues (though it should be 
mentioned that in his chapter Alexander Bird presents some old-fashioned 
received views).  But even if they do, their approach echoes more nuanced 
and relaxed treatments of these issues. 
James A.  Marcum, for example, discusses the “the evolving notion and role of 
the incommensurability thesis” in Kuhn’s oeuvre showing the continuously 
reflexive and intellectually receptive character of Kuhn’s accommodation to 
his critics.  By touching also on the question of truth and realism Marcum’s 
chapter brings us to Michela Massimi’s contribution who asks such questions 
as “Was Kuhn some kind of relativist? Did he advocate a form of constructiv-
ism? Or was he a mild realist, after all?” (p. 135). She reconstructs Paul 
Hoyningen-Huene’s Kantian realist and Ron Giere’s perspectival realist read-
ing of Kuhn and formulates new challenges regarding the Kantian overtones 
in Kuhn’s philosophy.  Finally, one of the editors, William J.  Devlin presents 
an account of ”truth” in Kuhn’s philosophical enterprise.  He shows how Kuhn 
tried to dismiss the notion of ”truth”’ (taken as the ”correspondence theory of 
truth”) altogether from (the philosophy of) science while maintaining that 
science aims at the knowledge of nature.  Devlin argues that Kuhn could over-
come this tension by accepting “the claim that science achieves the truth 
about nature, with the qualification that a new alternative theory of truth is 
introduced” (p. 161).  His new theory is based on a Kantian distinction be-
tween phenomenon and the independent world and claims that “science 
achieves knowledge of nature as the phenomenal world, but does not achieve 
the truth about nature as the independent world” (p. 162)—hence we got the 
“phenomenal-world correspondence theory of truth” which seems to be com-
patible with the Kuhnian enterprise. 




Most of the papers, however, are concerned with such notions of and ap-
proaches to SSR that fell off the radar right after its publication.  These include 
normalcy and normal science, the generality and explanatory power of Kuhn’s 
scheme.  Alan Richardson formulates some neat worries about the nature and 
role of philosophy and history of science against a Kuhnian back-
ground. He claims that scholars should not “fret so much about the nature 
of  their  relationship as they try better to articulate their own explanatory 
practices” (p. 49). 
Cyrus C.  M.  Mody urges philosophers, historians and sociologists of science to 
focus on what Kuhn called “normal science” since “if we’re still interested in 
pushing the Kuhnian project forward, then knowing more about what scien-
tists and engineers do all day is fundamental to understanding the structure 
both of scientific revolutions and of scientific normalcy” (p. 101).  The ethnog-
raphy of practicing scientists shows that Kuhn’s notion of normal science is 
too restrictive and needs an extension.  “Normal science,” says Mody (p. 96), 
“achieves many more goals than just the clearing away of anomalies and open 
questions;” hence normal science demands more attention than revolutionary 
science if we wish to understand its nature and workings. 
The descriptive project of science is the subject of Steven Shapin and Alexan-
der Bird.  The former argues that to understand SSR we have to understand 
first its historical contexts and underpinnings given that it was “produced in 
a historically specific set of circumstances” (p. 12).  Nonetheless, Shapin pro-
vides only more or less general insights into the micro cosmos of Kuhn and 
instead looks at the overall settings of his project.  He argues that Kuhn was 
thought to be anti-scientific, anti-rational and relativistic because he did not 
celebrate science uncritically for its own sake—Shapin does not assert wheth-
er Kuhn tries to present a rational or irrational picture of science.  Kuhn just 
described what he has found in scientific texts and among the practices be-
hind those texts.  While for many “science was too precious, and especially too 
fragile, a flower to be dealt with in an ordinary, matter-of-fact sort of way” (p. 
14), Kuhn provided a realistic account in the sense that he has taken at face 
value what learned from (his so-called Aristotle) experience. 
Kuhn is placed in a Hegelian narrative of thesis, antithesis, and synthesis 
(normal science, anomaly, and paradigm-shift) in Alexander Bird’s chapter.  
By indicating the external-internal debate of philosophers of science, Bird 
presents a new account of Kuhn’s concerns.  According to him, Kuhn was an 
internalist in the sense that he did not deal with general external factors (such 
as politics, religion etc.) since they do not surface in the normal scientific en-
terprise.  As Shapin and Mody argue for the relevance of normal science, Bird 
too regards it to be of utmost importance.  He also shows that Kuhn took seri-





science–anomaly–crisis–revolution provides a scheme for understanding and 
explaining science in general terms. 
The last two chapters of the volume focus on influences of and on Kuhn.  Brad 
Wray touches upon the relation between sociology of science and Kuhn—
whether there were any influences in any direction.  He provides a detailed 
empirical comparison and reveals some misunderstanding of a highly com-
plex situation.  Unfortunately, though such figures as Robert Merton and Ber-
nard Barber are referred to, they do not play a vital role in the chapter despite 
their serious efforts of promoting and developing sociology of knowledge and 
science in the United States.  The last chapter in the volume is Paul Hoyning-
en-Huene’s “Kuhn’s Development Before and After Structure”.  It matches the 
reader’s expectations: the author describes Kuhn’s early formative years with 
the neglected influence of Wittgenstein and provides many details concerning 
the mature Kuhn and his last project, which remained unfinished. 
Though the volume contains two more chapters (one from Sherrilyn Roush 
and one from Rogier De Langhe and Peter Rubens), they are concerned with 
such general issues (related to Kuhn but discussed without any exegetical or 
interpretative aims) as the relation between the success and failures of past 
science to contemporary science and whether they have any bearings on it 
(Roush) and the difference and relation between theory choice and theory 
search (De Langhe and Rubens).  While their issues are important and their 
discussions are illuminating, they represent the weakest link in the historical 
settings of the volume. 
Though many more questions could have been covered (like the neglected 
influences on Kuhn from such figures as Philipp Frank, James Conant and his 
other Harvard fellows, or the sociological and historical question how Kuhn 
became “Kuhn”), 50 Years On constitutes a decisive step towards the reevalua-
tion of Kuhn’s Structure.  It might also lead to new research programs on 
normal science and its internal/external settings instigating many more inter-
disciplinary studies.  Since normal science is embedded into many ordinary 
practices with sociological, psychological, economical, anthropological and 
other cognitive and non-cognitive concerns (such as the taste, customs, 
hobbies, and interests of scientists and their co-workers) interdisciplinary 
studies are inevitable if we aim to understand what science was, is, and/or 
should be. 
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